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by Gilan
Documents 16A-D: 13 Athens Guidelines
16A: Dirk Stikker, "Annual Political Appraisal Special Report by the Secretary General on NATO Defence Policy," 17 April 1962, NATO Secret
16B: "Joint Meeting of the Foreign and Defence Ministers," Verbatim Record of the meeting of the Council held on Saturday, 5th May 1962, COSMIC Top Secret (Note 16)
16C: Statement Made on Saturday 5 May by Secretary McNamara at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Athens," COSMIC Top Secret.
16D: "Summary Record of a meeting of the Council held in the Zappeion Building in Athens on Saturday 5th May 1962 at 5 p.m., COSMIC Top Secret
16D: "Summary Record of a meeting of the Council held in the Zappeion Building in Athens on Saturday 5th May 1962 at 5 p.m., COSMIC Top Secret
Source: Copies courtesy of NATO Archives, Brussels
By May 1962, the U.S. had deployed some 5,000 nuclear weapons in NATO Europe. Agreements with host governments, e.g., with Italy on the deployment of Jupiter missiles, gave them a veto over use, but the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) had effective power to use them in an emergency. (Note 17) Nevertheless, European members of NATO wanted more of a say in nuclear use decisions.
While the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF) was, in part, designed to give NATO members some sense of participation in decision making on nuclear weapons, it never got off the ground. Also troubling European members of NATO was lack of knowledge of nuclear weapons as well as uncertainty about the durability of the U.S. nuclear commitment to NATO. Could Western Europe count on Washington to make nuclear forces available in a crisis? To address those concerns, among others, NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker prepared a report in the spring of 1962 based upon his consultations with London and Washington. It concluded with a set of guidelines that included U.S. assurances about the availability of U.S. and British nuclear weapons, the provision of information on nuclear weapons to NATO allies, and consultations with the allies about nuclear weapons use. While consultation would not be possible if the Soviets launched an "unmistakable" nuclear attack on Western Europe, it would be in the event of a conventional attack or a smaller-scale nuclear attack. The Americans and the British also declared their intent to consult with the Council on the use of nuclear weapons "anywhere in the world," but with the usual loophole: "if time permits." Stikker also raised the possibility of a "restricted group" to establish multilateral political control over the use of nuclear weapons assigned to NATO forces, but that proposal inspired little interest.
While the proposed Multilateral Force (MLF) was, in part, designed to give NATO members some sense of participation in decision making on nuclear weapons, it never got off the ground. Also troubling European members of NATO was lack of knowledge of nuclear weapons as well as uncertainty about the durability of the U.S. nuclear commitment to NATO. Could Western Europe count on Washington to make nuclear forces available in a crisis? To address those concerns, among others, NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker prepared a report in the spring of 1962 based upon his consultations with London and Washington. It concluded with a set of guidelines that included U.S. assurances about the availability of U.S. and British nuclear weapons, the provision of information on nuclear weapons to NATO allies, and consultations with the allies about nuclear weapons use. While consultation would not be possible if the Soviets launched an "unmistakable" nuclear attack on Western Europe, it would be in the event of a conventional attack or a smaller-scale nuclear attack. The Americans and the British also declared their intent to consult with the Council on the use of nuclear weapons "anywhere in the world," but with the usual loophole: "if time permits." Stikker also raised the possibility of a "restricted group" to establish multilateral political control over the use of nuclear weapons assigned to NATO forces, but that proposal inspired little interest.
NATO ministers approved the guidelines at the famous May 1962 Athens meeting of the North Atlantic Council during which Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara gave a highly controversial and comprehensive exposition of U.S. strategy and the risks of nuclear weapons use. (Note 18) The records of this meeting include Dean Rusk's offer of sea-based Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles for a multilateral NATO nuclear force designed to give European members a voice in nuclear use decisions. Washington ultimately abandoned MLF-type solutions and interest turned to organizational solutions to give the Europeans greater knowledge of the complexities and dilemmas of nuclear weapons planning. By 1966, partly as a result of the influence of U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, NATO had established the Nuclear Planning Group which became a central locus for formulating and assessing nuclear options for a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation.
Documents 6A and B: Henry Kissinger to President Ford, "Talking Points, NSC Meeting, Monday, October 7, 1974," Top Secret
Document 6A: National Security Council FOIA release, 1999
Document 6B: Excised copy released by Gerald R. Ford Library, May 2006; Source: National Security Council Meeting File, box 1, NSC meeting 10/7/74
Dissimilar releases of Henry Kissinger's "Talking Points" prepared for President Ford as background for an NSC meeting on the SALT II negotiations highlight the conflicting policies that security reviewers have taken toward releasing or continuing the classification of the numbers of nuclear delivery systems. Variant A, an earlier release by the National Security Council in 1999, illustrates the Clinton administration's openness. As is evident from variant B, recently released by the Ford Library, the Defense Department's security reviewers are using the same procedures that governed the recent release of the McNamara DPM from 1964 and the BDM history: excise all numbers of U.S. strategic weapons systems. When the National Security Council met that day to discuss SALT II, Kissinger read from the "Talking Points" to keep the participants up-to-speed. The declassified minutes of the NSC meeting, also released in 1999 and available on the Gerald R. Ford Library Web site, reproduces the text of parts of Kissinger's briefing paper, which he read to the meeting participants, including virtually all of the numbers excised from the most recent release.